Oktawian Nawrot. Department for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science , University of. Gdansk .. Ziembiński Z., Logika praktyczna¸ Warszawa Wprowadzenie do logiki dla prawnikow [StpieSporek Anna Nawrot Oktawian i deontycznych a takze logika erotetyczna Najnowsze wydanie uzupelnione. , p. , Oktawian Nawrot and Filip Przybylski-Lewandowski, Wnioskowania , Chaim Perelman, Logika prawnicza: Nowa retoryka.
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Festschrift for Carlos E. Etiam clarum ius exigit interpretationem. As he stated in his monograph from I suppose that at this point we do not have any controversy: On the other hand, the principle of clara non sunt interpretanda obligates the judge to provide a direct justification for any deviation from the ethnical linguistic meaning of legal terms.
One reservation must be made: Recently, a proposal regarding such an explanation from the perspective of contemporary empirical psycholinguistics was elaborated by Marcin Romanowicz. However, the situation changes if we consider the role of these principles in the law-governed state Rechtsstaat.
Eine struktur analytische Studie.
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Marek Zirk-Sadowski Ryszard Sarkowicz It implies that the omnia sunt interpretanda principle can also be applied in the arranging and in the reconstructive phase of derivational interpretation. He distinguished interpretation sensu largissimo SL-interpretationinterpretation sensu largo L-interpretation and interpretation sensu stricto S-interpretation.
For instance, Clausdieter Schott maintains that the maxim interpretatio cessat in claris was invented by the lawyers of the Renaissance: In the Unrechtsstaatno matter whether it is a totalitarian or an authoritarian state, these principles can be equally used for the iniquitous manipulation of the results of legal interpretation for political or ideological reasons.
When we consider the following quotation: Studia prawa prywatnego I 1: Interpretacja jako proces dekodowania tekstu prawnego [Interpretation as a Process of Decoding Legal Text]. Luigi Ferrajoli Raimo Siltala Riccardo Guastini The emphasis by enhanced letter spacing is in the original.
The ending point of interpretation.
Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki Statute of 19 June ]. Archives de philosophie du droit XVII Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law.
The principle that clear legal provisions do not require any interpretation is first and foremost pragmatically justified. Hence, legal interpretation is always necessary logiak omnia sunt interpretanda!
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Saverio Masuelli But the semantic univocity can probably be treated only as a regulative idea of juristic interpretive reasoning, mainly because of practical and epistemological reasons open texture, defeasibility, interpretive regressus ad infinitum. The paper addresses a contemporary Polish debate on the limits and functions of juristic interpretation of law.
Independently from the controversies over the linguistic sense of the clara non sunt interpretanda principle, it has to be noted that formerly in oogika in the s it was able to play a positive role in limiting the temptations of the totalitarian system, by emphasising the role of the certainty of legal text.
Fifthly, according to the current view, the clarificative theory is related to the context of justification of interpretive decisions, whilst the derivational theory is surely primarily focussed on the context of discovery. However, this amendment is only indirectly grounded on an extensional criterion. T he legal norm, i. Therefore, the principles of clara non sunt interpretanda and interpretatio cessat in claris must be abandoned altogether.
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Methodology, Philosophy, Legal Theory]. Ustawa z dnia 19 czerwca r.
Consequently, legal language has to tolerate the existence of interpretive doubt, even concerning the question of whether a text must or must not be interpreted. On the other hand, in an unspecified — yet, in his opinion, a significant and constantly increasing — number of cases, these courts have interpreted the law despite the fact that the linguistic meaning of the given legal provisions was clear and unambiguous.
W e can take for granted that the direct understanding of legal provisions is empirically possible. What is still more important is that the semantic univocity of a given legal norm does not imply its pragmatic clarity: This argument is borrowed by Zie Thus the real controversy seems to be limited to the case of the judge who has to apply a new in a subjective, or also in an objective sense legal provision, which she has never interpreted before.
Lech Morawski In my opinion, however, the above evaluations and empirical argumentation are based on interpreted facts, and — more importantly — the samples of judicial decisions, to which the opponents refer, are not representative at all. Yet, I am going to propose an analytical solution of a conceptual kind, mainly based on the analysis related to the juristic concept of a legal norm that is used in the legal discourse.
Law, Truth, and Reason.